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INTRODUCTION
Consider this sentence: “The Shining Path is a heroic organization.”
Over the past thirty years, the Shining Path has waged a violent guerilla
war against the Peruvian government, prompting the European Union to
designate the group as a terrorist organization.1 In certain European coun-
tries, speech inciting or glorifying terrorist organizations is criminalized.2
As a result, citizens risk prosecution if they do not carefully limit what
* J.D. candidate, May 2014, University of Michigan Law School. I thank my editors,
the European Union Law Colloquium, and Professor Daniel Halberstam for guidance on this
Note.
1. Council Decision 2012/333/CFSP, 2012 O.J. (L 165) 72 (EU).
2. See infra Part III.
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they say about the Shining Path, or other terrorist organizations. But
where does free speech end and incitement to terrorism begin?
The debate over free speech and incitement to terrorism is actively
being played out on the Internet. In recent years, Islamic fundamentalists
have used the Internet as a tool to radicalize discontented citizens
throughout Europe.3 Several of these radicalized citizens have committed
terrorist attacks.4 In response, the European Union (EU) has taken strong
action to police the Internet. Specialized European agencies have devel-
oped sophisticated means of policing cyberterrorism. CleanIT is the most
well-known Internet policing program: it seeks to shut down websites as-
sociated with the dissemination of terrorist information.5 Increased law
enforcement has been accompanied by international and regional initia-
tives to criminalize cyberterrorism. In 2004, the European Council coordi-
nated the Convention on Cybercrime, which raised criminal penalties for
Internet crimes and hate speech.6 In the aftermath of the Convention, the
European Union passed a Framework Decision aimed at criminalizing the
incitement of terrorism.7
Despite increased enforcement, there is widespread uncertainty about
what constitutes the incitement of terrorism in the European Union. The
EU has taken the unfortunate half measure of advocating that member
states criminalize the glorification of terrorism, but has provided little gui-
dance about what constitutes terrorism or glorification. As a result, states
have adopted fractured approaches. The law must be clear enough for any
person to judge whether or not his speech might be in violation, but the
fractured approach renders such judgment impossible. National courts
have reacted against incitement prosecutions by narrowly construing the
language of broad legislation.8 On the regional level, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been one of the leading judicial bodies in
judging the balance between free speech and incitement to terrorism, using
a multitude of factors to guide its analysis.9
This Note argues that the European Union should reconsider the am-
biguous language of its Framework Decision in line with judgments by
national courts and the ECtHR. Although the Lisbon Treaty formally
abolished framework decisions in favor of directives and regulations in the
3. Internet Jihad: A World Wide Web of Terror, ECONOMIST, July 12, 2007 [hereinaf-
ter Internet Jihad] available at http://www.economist.com/node/9472498.
4. Sebastien Rotella, Syria’s Jihadi Migration Emerges as Top Terror Threat in Eu-
rope, Beyond, PROPUBLICA, (July 24, 2013, 11:56 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/
syrias-jihadi-migration-emerges-as-top-terror-threat-in-europe-beyond.
5. About the Project, THE CLEANIT PROJECT: REDUCING THE IMPACT OF TERRORIST
USE OF INTERNET, http://www.cleanitproject.eu/about-the-project/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
6. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 11, 2001, ETS No. 185.
7. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, 2002 O.J. (L 164) 3 (EU) available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:0003:0007:EN:PDF
[hereinafter 2002 Framework Decision].
8. See infra Section III.B.
9. See infra Section III.C.
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area of criminal justice,10 the EU should assemble a set of directives to
clarify its position on cyberterrorism and free speech. Elements worthy of
consideration include subjective intent, the likelihood of violence, and
causality. The EU should be particularly mindful of the challenges posed
by the Internet, especially as it relates to public vs. private speech in the
incitement context. A clearer EU standard on the incitement of terrorism
would serve as a model for member states to ensure that legal standards
are sufficiently clear, thereby avoiding the welter of conflicting approaches
and judgments that offer little guidance to citizens or prosecutors. Any
accompanying law enforcement should seek to understand root causes of
discontent, while engaging at-risk communities to counter terrorism and
violence.
I. BACKGROUND: CYBERTERRORISM, PROPAGANDA, AND THE
DEBATE ON “INCITEMENT”
In October 2005, British police raided an apartment in West London.
There, they arrested Younis Tsouli, the 22-year-old son of a Moroccan
tourism official.11 Tsouli’s Internet alias was “Irhabi007,” a name under
which he labored as one of the most notorious “cyber-jihadists” in Eu-
rope.12 He regularly distributed radical propaganda, including statements
by the late Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq. He used
his studies in information technology to hack into different databases, in-
cluding the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department, to dis-
tribute large video files glorifying terrorist acts.13 Tsouli used stolen credit
card numbers to create jihadi websites and was implicated in complicated
terrorist plots centered in numerous countries throughout Europe.14
Younis Tsouli was described as “Al-Qaeda’s most famous web propa-
gandist.”15 He facilitated contacts between thousands of individuals, capi-
talizing on the virtual anonymity of the Internet to advance his cause.16
UK prosecutors charged Tsouli alongside Waseem Mughal, a British-born
graduate of biochemistry, and Tari al-Daour, a United Arab Emirates-
10. See European Union Legal Acts, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0032_en.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
11. Internet Jihad, supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (“Irhabi007’s desire for real action may have led to his downfall. He was not
only involved in a dispersed network of jihadi propaganda, but also, it seems, in a decentral-
ised web of terrorist plots. In October 2005 police in Bosnia arrested a cyber-jihadist who
called himself “Maximus”, a Swedish teenager of Bosnian extraction called Mirsad
Bektasevic . . . Among the material recovered from Mr Bektasevic’s flat, police found 19kg of
explosives, weapons, a video with instructions for making a suicide vest and a video recording
of masked men proclaiming their membership of “al-Qaeda in northern Europe”. On his
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born law student. The three pled guilty to charges of incitement to murder
and conspiracy to murder. Tsouli was sent to jail for ten years. The other
men received shorter sentences.17
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) divides
cyberterrorism into six different categories: propaganda, financing, train-
ing, planning, execution, and cyber-attacks.18 Propaganda, which is not per
se illegal,lies on one end of the spectrum.19 On the other end are cyber-
attacks, which generally refer to the use of computer networks “to disrupt
computer systems, servers, or underlying infrastructure, through the use of
hacking, advanced persistent threat techniques, computer viruses,
malware, phlooding, or other means of unauthorized or malicious ac-
cess.”20 Cyber-attacks are clearly illegal. Cyberterrorism is defined
broadly and includes a number of possible elements. The Internet is a ver-
satile medium that allows extremist groups to reproduce content on a
widely accessible scale. The Dutch domestic intelligence service once “de-
scribe[d] the Internet as the ‘turbocharger’ of radicalisation.”21 In the UK,
security agencies have been described as fighting a “covert war in cyber-
space against extremist Islamist Internet sites.”22 According to the charges
against him, Younis Tsouli was a leader of this covert war, inciting terrorist
acts and contributing logistical support to terrorist plots.
The Internet creates fora where users may download and distribute
content associated with terrorism. Scholars have used several metaphors
to understand the role of the Internet: some argued that it is “not a ‘virtual
training camp’” but is instead a “resource bank maintained and accessed
largely by self-radicalized sympathizers.”23 The Internet is an online li-
brary for Islamic religious literature, political opinion, and detailed in-
struction manuals on guerilla warfare and tactical operations training.24
Many of the manuals borrow heavily from the U.S. Army Field Manual.
17. Id.
18. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR
TERRORIST PURPOSES 3 (2012) [hereinafter UNODC REPORT].
19. Id. at 6 (“While propaganda per se is not generally prohibited, the use of propa-
ganda by terrorists to incite acts of terrorism is considered unlawful by many Member States.
The Internet provides an abundance of material and opportunities to download, edit and
distribute content that may be considered unlawful glorification of, or provocation to, acts of
terrorism.”).
20. Id. at 11.
21. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CYBER SECURITY AND
POLITICALLY, SOCIALLY, AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED ATTACKS 13 (2009) [hereinafter
EU PARLIAMENT REPORT] (by Paul Cornish).
22. Kim Sengupta, Spies Take War on Terror into Cyberspace, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 3,
2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/spies-take-war-on-terror-into-cyberspace-
949706.html.
23. Anne Stenersen, The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?, 20 TERRORISM & POL.
VIOLENCE 215, 216 (2008).
24. Id. at 215.
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Others are the original work of jihadis with military experience.25 Former
soldiers from the Afghan Wars, Palestinian militants, and Internet users
without combat experience have all contributed to the abundance of In-
ternet literature.26 One “al-Qaeda jihadi Internet forum” has uploaded a
fifty-one page manual entitled “The Art of Recruitment,” intended to
show how individuals can be recruited and “eventually establish active ter-
rorist cells.”27 In certain cases, radical groups offer interactive tutorials on
subjects ranging from weapons handling to writing malicious code to sabo-
tage computer networks.28 The line between training camp and library can
be thin.
Policymakers argue that the threat of radicalization in Europe is grow-
ing. They cite the explosion of extremist websites in recent years: “from a
handful in 2000 to several thousand today.”29 Gilles de Kerchove, the EU
anti-terrorism coordinator, estimated in 2008 that “about 5,000 Internet
sites were being used to radicalise young people.”30 Scholars have argued
that cyber-terrorism can be viewed as a microcosm of strained relations
between Europeans and a growing population of Muslim citizens. Euro-
pean States have actively struggled with how to manage social integration
within their borders. To date, Muslims in Europe, especially recent immi-
grants from the Middle East, remain some of the poorest and politically
alienated citizens.31
EU member states have quickly responded to the threat of radicaliza-
tion. Certain states have passed laws criminalizing the use of propaganda
to incite acts of terrorism.32 Propaganda, specifically the incitement of ter-
rorism, is one of the more controversial forms of cyberterrorism, since le-
25. Id. at 217. (“The Internet contains a vast amount of written training material.
There are pamphlets and handbooks available on almost any topic considered relevant for
training and preparation. Some of the most common topics are: conventional weapons, im-
provised weapons and explosives, field tactics, guerrilla warfare, organisational and field se-
curity, and physical training. Some of the manuals are plain text, while others, especially
manuals aiming to teach practical skills, may be illustrated with explanatory sketches or
photos.”).
26. Id. at 219.
27. EU PARLIAMENT REPORT, supra note 21, at 13.
28. Id. at 12 (“With instruction manuals so readily available, the Internet has become a
place of teaching and instruction. Interactive tutorials can be offered, in a wide range of
subjects from weapon handling through to the skills needed to write malicious code and
sabotage computer networks. Tactical and operational training can be conducted through
simulators and even online computer games, including Massively Multiplayer Online Role-
Playing Games (MMORPGs).”).
29. Internet Jihad, supra note 3.
30. Oana Lungescu, EU Tightens Anti-Terrorism Laws, BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2008,
5:12 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7355446.stm.
31. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and
What We Do Not Know, 33 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 797, 798–99 (2010) (“Terrorist
attacks, foiled plots, and trials of recent years indicate that ever younger Europeans who did
not spend extended periods outside Europe have become involved with militant Islamism
and, apparently, radicalized over a very short time span.”).
32. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
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gal standards vary from country to country. Ben Saul, a Professor of Law
at the University of Sydney, wrote, “Propaganda has long been the hand-
maiden to violence: inciting, justifying and naturalising it; ploughing the
ground for violence by softening our psychological defences to it and de-
sensitizing us to its brutalising effects.”33 But the division between free
speech propaganda and the actual incitement of terrorism is often blurred.
The UNODC considers incitement a pre-stage of terrorism.34 Incite-
ment is often seen as an activity that helps to legitimate terrorism or con-
tributes to terrorist recruitment efforts. The issue of legitimization,
however, is particularly vague. There is no fixed definition of incitement,
although numerous examples abound in both literature and policy docu-
ments. Incitement “can consist of public provocation to commit terrorism
or public praise for terrorist acts, dehumanisation of the victims of terror-
ist attacks, or mere understanding for the underlying reasons for terrorist
acts.”35
One of the more developed legal understandings of incitement to vio-
lence has emerged in the context of genocide. Incitement to violence has
been included in international instruments since the end of World War II
The Nuremberg Tribunal convicted and executed Nazi newspaper pub-
lisher Julius Streicher for inciting the murder of Europe’s Jews, even
though he had not committed any of the murders himself.36 The Genocide
Convention of 1948 formulated the “incitement of genocide,” legal stan-
dards that have since been used by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.37
33. Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence, 28 U. NEW S.
WALES L.J. 868, 868 (2005).
34. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 6. (“Recruitment, radicalization and incite-
ment to terrorism may be viewed as points along a continuum.”).
35. Bibi Van Ginkel, Incitement to Terrorism: A Matter of Prevention or Repression? 3
(Aug. 2, 2011) (Int’l Ctr. for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper).
36. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Incitement to Genocide in Interna-
tional Law, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?Module
Id=10007839 (last updated June 20, 2014) [hereinafter HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA] (“The
trial of leading German officials before the International Military Tribunal (IMT), the best
known of the postwar war crimes trials, formally opened in Nuremberg on November 20,
1945, only six and a half months after Germany surrendered. Among the twenty-four defend-
ants was Julius Streicher, publisher of the antisemitic German weekly Der Stürmer. On Octo-
ber 1, 1946, the IMT convicted Streicher of crimes against humanity in connection with his
incitement to the mass murder of Europe’s Jewish population. Streicher was executed for his
crimes.”). See also Robert Bernstein et al., Inciting Genocide Is a Crime, WALL ST. J., availa-
ble at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303592404577364283553552766.
37. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 11 (“[O]ne can better compare the criminalisation of
incitement to terrorism to the international crime of incitement to genocide, formulated
under the Genocide Convention and also incorporated in the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) and in similar terms in the Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC).”).
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Incitement in the context of genocide occurs when one individual uses
forms of communication to encourage others to commit crimes. Communi-
cation may include broadcasts, publications, drawings, images, or
speeches. A necessary precondition of incitement, according to the Geno-
cide Convention, is that the incitement takes a public form and is thus
distinguished “from an act of private incitement (which could be punisha-
ble under the Genocide Convention as ‘complicity in genocide’).”38 Incite-
ment to genocide must be proven to be “direct,” meaning that the speaker
and the listener perceive the speech to be a “call to action.”39 Moreover,
incitement to genocide is an inchoate crime: “a proof of result is not neces-
sary for the crime to have been committed, only that it had the potential to
spur genocidal violence.”40 In the international context, the speaker’s in-
tent is the most important element of the offense, rather than the actual
effect of the speech.41
The International Court of Justice considered intent as a crucial ele-
ment during the “incitement” cases associated with the Rwandan Geno-
cide.42 In 1994, Rwandan Radio operators actively encouraged Hutus to
hurt and kill Tutsis. “The Rwanda Media Case emphasized that incitement
to commit genocide required calling on the audience (be they listeners or
readers) to take action of some kind.”43 Absent such a call, inflammatory
language may qualify as hate speech but does not constitute incitement.
Israeli scholar Yael Ronen explains, “[t]he weight exerted by the inciters
on the incitees lies not in the issuance of direct orders; but in sowing and
nurturing in their audience the ideological foundation from which the will-
ingness to act then emerges.”44 Ronen stressed that this is accomplished
through “[p]ersistent, pervasive vilification and disparagement of the tar-
get.”45 Yet Ronen’s definition goes well beyond what the Genocide Con-
vention requires: any speech that prepares the ground for hate among
listeners should be criminalized. Drawing from the Genocide Convention,
the International Criminal Tribune for Rwanda in Akayesu noted that




42. Id. (“The incitement provision of the Genocide Convention took on new impor-
tance in the wake of genocide in the Central African nation of Rwanda . . . In 1997, the
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) indicted three
Rwandans for ‘incitement to genocide’: Hassan Ngeze who founded, published, and edited
Kangura (Wake Others Up!), a Hutu-owned tabloid that in the months preceding the geno-
cide published vitriolic articles dehumanizing the Tutsi as inyenzi (cockroaches) though never
called directly for killing them; and Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, foun-
ders of a radio station called Radı́o Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) that indi-
rectly and directly called for murder, even at times to the point of providing the names and
locations of people to be killed.”).
43. Id.
44. Yaël Ronen, Incitement to Terrorist Acts Under International Law, 23 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 654, 663 (2010).
45. Id.
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speech must be “public” and “perceived” by both speaker and listener,
creating a direct call to action.46
Experts attempt to draw a distinction between direct and indirect
forms of incitement, but prevailing legal definitions vary widely. Indirect
incitement, often referred to as “glorification” or “apologie,” straddles the
fence between legality and illegality. Ronen argues that the criminalization
of incitement must include not only direct calls for action, but also any
justification or glorification of terrorist acts.47 On this point, Ronen dis-
agrees with the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, who has argued that
incitement must be separated from glorification.48 The Secretary General
acknowledged that statements of glorification may applaud past acts and
might offend the sensitivities of individual persons and society, particularly
the victims of terrorist acts.49 But he nevertheless emphasized that vague
terms of uncertain scope, such as glorifying or promoting terrorism, are
not used when restricting the freedom of expression.50
Despite certain disagreements, experts agree that the offense of incite-
ment to commit a terrorist act will be human rights compliant where in-
citement is supported by an intention to promote terrorism and a causality
link between the incitement and the likely realization of a terrorist act.51
In other words, there must be a link between incitement and act. Glorifica-
tion without a link to an act should be protected by freedom of speech. Yet
even this clarification leaves a host of unresolved questions. What if a
group glorifies terrorist acts in general but no specific act is ever commit-
ted? What if one group prompts another to commit an act but there is no
link between the two groups? Would a teacher be liable if he or she
presented a past act of terrorism in a favorable light if a student was then
moved to correct a perceived present injustice through an act of
terrorism?
II. FREE SPEECH STANDARDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE TO CYBERTERRORISM
Since September 11, 2001, the international community has orches-
trated an organized response to terrorism on the Internet. This Part aims
to illustrate the evolution of the free speech standards and corresponding
46. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 556–57 (Sept. 2,
1998).
47. Id.
48. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/63/
337, (Aug. 28, 2008).
49. Id. ¶ 61.
50. Id.
51. Office for Democratic Inst. and Human Rights, Org. for Sec. and Co-Operation in
Eur. [OSCE], Human Rights Considerations in Combating Incitement to Terrorism and Re-
lated Offences 9, OSCE/COE EXPERT WORKSHOP: PREVENTING TERRORISM: FIGHTING IN-
CITEMENT AND RELATED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AT 9 (Oct. 19–20, 2006) [hereinafter OSCE
Report], available at http://osce.org/odihr/22052?download=true.
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international efforts to police cybercrime. Section A traces the evolution
of European legal standards governing the freedom of expression and
compares them with the American Brandenburg standard. Section B ana-
lyzes the international instruments designed to protect the freedom of ex-
pression, specifically the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Section C examines the Convention on Cybercrime and
global efforts to police terrorism on the Internet.
A. The Evolution of European Standards on the
Freedom of Expression
Contemporary standards governing the freedom of expression in Eu-
rope have been shaped by the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), which was signed on November 4, 1950. Primarily, the Conven-
tion sought to address the atrocities of the Second World War.52 In this
way, the Convention was part of a wider human rights agenda, which also
included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.53 One scholar
noted, “It should be taken into account that the European Convention was
part of the moral answer to the Nazi ideology after the Second World War
and that the patterns followed by the European Court in its case law have
been a tribute to this cause.”54
The Convention guaranteed a broad range of human rights to citizens
of member countries of the Council of Europe, which included almost all
European nations. The Convention established the European Court of
Human Rights as a forum for individuals to bring fundamental rights
claims against European governments. Judgments finding violations are
binding on the States concerned and they are obliged to execute them. Yet
the Convention recognized that freedom of expression was not an absolute
right. The freedoms enshrined in certain sections were counterbalanced by
the language from others:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, re-
strictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, terri-
torial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the author-
ity and impartiality of the judiciary.55
52. ROBIN C.A. WHITE & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 3 (5th ed. 2010).
53. Id. at 1.
54. Amaya Úbeda de Torres, Freedom of Expression Under the European Convention
on Human Rights: A Comparison with the Inter-American System of Protection of Human
Rights, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2003, at 6, 9.
55. See art. 10(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms for further information. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
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As the twentieth century unfolded, European governments sought to
use the ECHR as a tool to balance their obligations regarding the freedom
of expression. On one hand, the European system considered freedom of
expression as a “necessary counterweight” to balance the executive, legis-
lative, and judicial branches of government.56 On the other hand, freedom
of expression had limits, especially when it concerned speech that could
harm a community. Many European governments passed legislation ren-
dering hate speech unlawful.57 The historical experience of European
countries led governments to support free speech, but only up to a certain
point past which speech became harmful to society.
European states took another major step on defining freedom of ex-
pression when they passed the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (Charter). The Charter acquired full legal effect when
the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009.58 Freedom of expression is
enshrined in Article 11, which reads, “Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.”59 According to the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), any restriction on freedom of expression must
be expressly established by law and:
[T]he law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able
to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the
legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be
regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient preci-
sion to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be
able—if need be with appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a
given action may entail.60
Further down, Article 52 of the Charter allows for various limitations
to be legally imposed, but it reiterates that those restrictions must be “pro-
vided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.”61
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union accedes to the
European Convention as an entity in its own right, making the Convention
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe
.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
56. Úbeda de Torres, supra note 54, at 7.
57. See infra Section III.B.
58. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm (last updated July 25, 2013).
59. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 55.
60. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49 (1979).
61. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 52, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
1.
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binding not only on the governments of the member states but also on the
supranational institutions of the EU.62
Free speech standards in Europe are different than they are in the
United States. Historically, the United States has been more tolerant of
speech that would be considered unacceptable (or even unlawful) under
European standards. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated the modern American standard on free speech, reversing the
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under Ohio state law.63 The Court
used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohib-
ited if it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and
(2) it is “likely to incite or produce such action.”64 The Court emphasized
that there is a difference between mere advocacy of abstract concepts, and
preparing and inciting a group to “imminent lawless action.”65 The two-
pronged test from Brandenburg remains the standard used by American
courts to evaluate inflammatory speech. As will be shown throughout this
Note, European jurists and policymakers have grappled with the appropri-
ate elements for free speech and have debated the usefulness of both Eu-
ropean and American approaches.
B. The International Protection of Fundamental Rights
Within the international context on incitement, states have an obliga-
tion to uphold the fundamental freedoms of their citizenry, including the
freedom of expression. In addition to the Charter of the Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and the ECHR, European Union member
states are also subject to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) when it comes to addressing the freedom of expression.
The ICCPR was passed in 1976.66 The ICCPR contains provisions for
both protecting freedom of speech and curtailing freedoms in the interest
of national security.67 The ICCPR states that maintaining national security
and public order are legitimate grounds for limiting freedom of speech.
Specifically, Article 19, paragraph 3 and Article 20, Paragraph 2 require
States to prohibit national, religious, or racial hatred that constitutes in-
citement to violence.68 Article 15 problematizes the enactment of “incite-
ment” legislation; it requires that governments not hold individuals guilty
for crimes that do not constitute crimes under national or international
law.69
62. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European and the Treaty Establishing
the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 6.
63. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969).
64. Id. at 447.
65. Id. at 448.
66. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr
.aspx
67. Id. at arts. 19–20.
68. Id. at art. 15.
69. Id.
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The language of Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the Char-
ter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union leave room for
ongoing debate. The UNODC notes that “in practice, striking the right
balance between preserving the right to freedom of expression and enforc-
ing criminal legislation targeting the incitement of terrorist acts continues
to be a challenge for Governments.”70 Human rights groups have ex-
pressed strong skepticism that glorifying terrorism is “sufficiently narrow
and precise” to violate the principle of legality and the right to freedom of
expression, “as enshrined in articles 15 and 19 of the [ICCPR].”71
These two principles, sufficient precision to enable a citizen to guide
his or her behavior and the ability of a citizen to foresee the consequences
of their speech, have proven problematic in the debate about incitement.
To date, terrorism lacks a widely-accepted definition under international
law.72 Sami Zeidan, a Lebanese scholar, has analyzed the obstacles to de-
fining terrorism:
There is no general consensus on the definition of terrorism. The
difficulty of defining terrorism lies in the risk it entails of taking
positions. The political value of the term currently prevails over its
legal one. Left to its political meaning, terrorism easily falls prey
to change that suits the interests of particular states at particular
times.73
British professor Jason Burke echoes Zeidan’s sentiment:
There are multiple ways of defining terrorism, and all are subjec-
tive. Most define terrorism as ‘the use or threat of serious vio-
lence’ to advance some kind of ‘cause’. Some state clearly the
kinds of group (‘sub-national’, ‘non-state’) or cause (political, ide-
ological, religious) to which they refer. Others merely rely on the
instinct of most people when confronted with an act that involves
innocent civilians being killed or maimed by men armed with ex-
plosives, firearms or other weapons.74
International groups have expressed an ongoing worry that the rush to
criminalize incitement may result in the restriction of free speech. In the
Joint Declaration on the Internet and Anti-Terrorism Measures, an inter-
disciplinary body, comprised of members of the United Nations (UN), Or-
ganization for Security and Economic Cooperation, and the Organization
of American States, worried “that the standard of restricting expression
which amounts to incitement, hitherto well-established in the areas of pub-
lic order and national security, is being eroded in favour of vague and
70. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 44.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 12.
73. Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community’s
Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT. L.J. 491, 491–92 (2004).
74. JASON BURKE, AL QAEDA: THE TRUE STORY OF RADICAL ISLAM 22 (2003).
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potentially very overbroad terms.”75 The UN Secretary General agreed,
stating that “the adoption of any overly vague or broad definition of the
term terrorism in domestic legislation could lead to criminalization of con-
duct that does not constitute terrorism as such.”76 The Secretary General
further cautioned that there is a danger in definitions that hamper “the
legitimate non-violent and peaceful exercise of fundamental rights and
freedoms.”77
C. The Convention on Cybercrime
In 2001, the Council of Europe organized the Convention on Cyber-
crime, the first international treaty78 addressing Internet and computer
crime, which entered into force in July 2004.79 The treaty sought to “har-
monize national laws,” coordinate law enforcement, and align objectives
among participating nations.80 It focused on some of the most widespread
and problematic Internet crimes: copyright infringement, fraud, child por-
nography, hate crimes, and financial crime. To date, 44 states have ratified
the convention, while another 9 states have signed the convention but
have not ratified it.81
In 2006, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime
came into force.82 States that ratified the Additional Protocol agreed to
75. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Op., OSCE Representative on Freedom
of the Media & OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration on the
Internet and Anti-Terrorism Measures art. 19 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=650&lID=1.
76. U.N. Secretary-General, The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/63/337 (Aug. 28, 2008).
77. Id.
78. Convention on Cybercrime: Summary of the Treaty, COUNCIL EUR., http://conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/185.htm (last accessed Jan. 12, 2015).
79. Convention on Cybercrime: CETS No.: 185, COUNCIL EUR., http://conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG (last updated Jan. 1,
2015); Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185, available at http://conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/185.htm.
80. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 20–21. (“For example, the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime requires parties to adopt legislation requiring Internet service
providers (ISPs) to preserve specified data stored on their servers for up to 90 days (renewa-
ble), if requested to do so by law enforcement during the course of a criminal investiga-
tion . . . [it] also requires parties to implement legislation relating to the production of stored
subscriber data. Such information may be crucial during the investigative stage to establish
the identity of a perpetrator of a terrorist act involving use of the Internet, and may include
the physical location of such person, as well as other related communication services em-
ployed in the commission of the act. The Convention also requires signatory States to estab-
lish minimum standards to enable real-time collection of traffic data associated with specified
communications and the interception of content data in relation to specified serious offences
under domestic law.”).
81. Id.
82. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminal-
isation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems,
Jan. 28, 2003, E.T.S. No. 189, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
189.htm.
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criminalize the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material through
computer systems, and any threats associated with this material.83 The Ad-
ditional Protocol has tasked states with balancing the needs of law en-
forcement with the protection of civil liberties. Specifically, Article 5 of
the Additional Protocol must be applied together with the basic provision
of Article 12 of the Convention on Cybercrime itself, which states that
criminalization must be carried out in a manner that respects human
rights.84 This does not mean that individuals can use free speech to express
hateful or violent messages. For instance, the Council of Europe’s Explan-
atory Report of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime
stated the “European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that the
denial or revision of ‘clearly established historical facts—such as the Holo-
caust—[. . .] would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Arti-
cle 17’ of the ECHR” when it ruled in the Lehideux and Isorni v. France
case of September 23, 1998.85
Advocates argue that the Convention deters cybercriminals from en-
gaging in illicit behavior.86 The Convention mandates sanctions and makes
cybercrimes extraditable offenses, thereby reducing the number of coun-
tries in which criminals can avoid prosecution. Critics have observed that
transposing Convention provisions into domestic law is difficult.87 Civil
liberties groups have criticized the Convention, arguing that it undermines
individual privacy rights.88 The ACLU, for example, has argued that “US
authorities will use the Convention to conduct surveillance . . . that would
not be allowed under current US law.”89 Further, skeptics note that not
enough states have signed the Convention for it to have an impact. Cyber-
criminals often use the Internet portals of Yemen or North Korea to
launch attacks; neither country is part of the Convention.90
Moreover, the Convention did not fix difficulties associated with inter-
national cooperation on incitement offenses. When authorities in one
country recognize an instance of cyberterrorism and want to cooperate
with another country, it is sometimes significant whether the alleged acts
also constitute a crime in the country receiving the request.91 This can
create problems for sharing Internet data and also extraditing individuals
83. Id. at arts. 3–4.
84. Id. at art. 5; Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 80, at art. 12.
85. Explanatory Report, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Con-
cerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through
Computer Systems, ¶ 42, Jan. 28, 2003, E.T.S. No. 189 (quoting Lehideux v. France, 1998-VII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, ¶ 47), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/reports/html/189.htm.
86. See, e.g., KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21208, CYBERCRIME:
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION 3 (2006).




91. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 97.
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accused of committing terroristic acts on the Internet.92 It is also possible
for authorities in one country to encounter difficulties in trying to shut
down websites from other jurisdictions due to differing laws about the
freedom of expression.93 As we will see, the difference in national ap-
proaches is something that has deeply affected the criminalization of the
incitement of terrorism.
III. EU LEGAL STANDARDS ON INCITEMENT AND THE
CHALLENGES OF INTERPRETATION
The European Union has encouraged states to criminalize the incite-
ment of terrorism through the passage of its Framework Decisions. But
the EU has used uncertain language to describe acts that should be
criminalized, leading to a wide divergence of member state approaches. As
a result, national courts have restricted the scope of member state legisla-
tion criminalizing incitement. The European Court of Human Rights has
offered similar guidance in cases balancing the national security concerns
with the freedom of expression (enshrined in Article 10 of the ECHR).
Part A considers the growing area of EU criminal law enforcement and
analyzes the language of the Framework Decisions. Part B examines the
fractured member state approaches to criminalizing the incitement of ter-
rorism, and the role of courts in narrowing broad legislative language. Part
C examines ECtHR incitement cases and the multitude of factors that the
court uses to guide its analysis.
A. EU Criminal Law and Framework Decisions on Terrorism
The European Union’s Third Pillar represents criminal justice and in-
ter-state cooperation. The first traces of EU criminal law enforcement
were found in the Maastricht Joint Actions on organized crime and racism
and xenophobia.94 The Treaty of Amsterdam clarified EU objectives in
the area of freedom, security and justice and sparked numerous EU efforts
to harmonize substantive criminal law among its Member States.95 By the
mid-2000s, the EU had passed a multitude of initiatives and Framework
Decisions to encourage collective cooperation on matter relating to “traf-
ficking in drugs and human beings, human smuggling, environmental
crime and, post-9/11, terrorism.”96 The Tampere Council and the Hague
92. Id.
93. Id. at 96.
94. Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for EU
Criminal Justice?, 34 EUR. L.R. 523, 524 (2009).
95. Id.
96. Id. (“The reasons for this renewed emphasis on the harmonisation of substantive
criminal law are threefold. The first reason has to do with efforts to amend and expand
existing Framework Decisions taking into account subsequent international developments in
the field. The second reason relates to a similar amendment process, but this time linked also
with efforts to constitutionally refresh the form of legal instrument used for third-pillar
harmonisation (namely to replace the vague Maastricht Joint Actions by the expressly legally
binding Amsterdam Framework Decisions). The third reason for new legislation also relates
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Program adopted the internal market formula of mutual recognition in the
third pillar.97 Extensive legislation accompanied this mutual recognition,
especially “in the area of terrorism, organized crime, and illicit drug traf-
ficking in accordance with the relevant provisions set out in of Articles
29–31 EU.”98
The European Union has taken an active role in fighting cyberterror-
ism but cannot be said to have a unified and comprehensive approach.99
The EU has actively encouraged its Member States to criminalize the in-
citement of terrorism. To this end, the EU has promoted a legal standard
through the adoption of Framework Decisions100 and the Council of Eu-
rope’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.101
In 2002, the European Union Council adopted Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.102 This Framework Decision har-
monizes the definition of terrorist offenses in all EU countries by adopting
a common definition of the term “terrorism.” Article 1 of the 2002 Frame-
work Decision defines terrorism as extending to acts including extensive
destruction of government or public facilities or infrastructures. The acts
must seriously damage any country or any international organization. The
acts must aim to seriously intimidate a population or “unduly compel[ ]”
any government or international organization to perform or abstain from
any act or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental structures of a
country.103 The Framework Decision also set forth jurisdictional rules to
to EU constitutional developments, and consists of the need to address ECJ case law and
harmonise criminal law under the first pillar.”).
97. Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council ¶¶ 33–37 (Oct. 15–16, 1999);
Council Document 16054/04, Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice in the European Union, art. 3.3.1, 2004 O.J. (C 236) 28–29. See also Mitsilegas, supra
note 96, at 537 (“The application of the principle of mutual recognition in the third pillar has
been the motor of European integration in criminal matters in the recent past. The endorse-
ment of mutual recognition as a key method of European integration in criminal matters in
Tampere in 1999 was followed by the adoption in 2001 of a detailed programme of measures
to implement the principle across the European Union.”).
98. Ester Herlin-Karnell, The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Criminal Law and Justice,
EUR. POL. ANALYSIS, Apr. 2008, at 2.
99. EU PARLIAMENT REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 (“The EU is very closely engaged in
cyber-security but cannot be said to have a comprehensive approach to the problem: the
EU’s responses are diverse, lack coherence and could at times conflict.”).
100. A Framework Decision is a legislative act of the EU used only within the EU’s
competences in police and judicial co-operation in criminal justice matters. Framework Deci-
sions were similar to directives in that they required member states to achieve particular
results without dictating the means of achieving that result. However unlike directives,
Framework Decisions were not capable of direct effect, they were only subject to the op-
tional jurisdiction of the ECJ and enforcement proceedings could not be taken by the Euro-
pean Commission for any failure to transpose a Framework Decision into domestic law.
101. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 41.
102. 2002 Framework Decision, supra note 7.
103. Id. at art. 1. C.f. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Response to the European Commission on
Inciting, Aiding, or Abetting Terrorist Offences 10 (2007) [hereinafter ICJ Report] (arguing
against the Framework’s “terrorist” definition).
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coordinate terrorism prosecutions and outlined measures to cope with vic-
tims of terrorism.104
The EU Council amended the Framework Decision in 2008.105 The
new version included provisions on public provocation to commit a terror-
ist offense, recruitment for terrorism, and training for terrorism.106 The
Council drew upon Security Council resolution 1624 (2005), which called
upon States to criminalize incitement to commit terrorist acts. The
amended Framework Decision creates a legal basis for prosecuting the dis-
tribution of terrorist propaganda.107 The Framework Decision offers pre-
cise definitions for terrorist offenses. The Council defines “public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence” as the “distribution, or other-
wise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite
the commission of one of the [terrorist] offences . . . [previously men-
tioned], where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist
offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be commit-
ted.”108 The incitement of terrorist acts is situated within the larger con-
text of aiding and abetting an offense.109 Even though the provisions of
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA are not Internet-specific, they cover
activities conducted by means of the Internet.110
EU member state representatives disagreed throughout the amend-
ment process about how to define “incitement.”111 Spain and Italy already
had laws punishing public incitement to terrorism.112 But Nordic countries
had strong reservations about the restriction of fundamental rights.113
These countries, along with civil rights campaigners, brought pressure to
leave not restrict the freedom of expression.114 As a result, concepts of
incitement, complicity, and attempt were not defined—their definitions
were left to the member states.115
104. 2002 Framework Decision, supra note 7, at arts. 9–10.
105. Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 21, 21 [hereinafter
2008 Framework Decision] available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2008:330:0021:0023:EN:PDF.
106. Id. at art. 3.
107. Id. at art. 3.
108. Id.
109. See id.; see also OSCE Report, supra note 51, at 5. (“Each Member State shall take
the necessary measures to ensure that inciting or aiding or abetting an offence referred to in
Article 1(1), Articles 2 or 3 is made punishable.”).
110. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 23.




115. Eugenia Dumitriu, The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Framework
Decision on Combating Terrorism, 5 GERMAN L.J. 585, 599 (2002) (“Whereas terrorist of-
fences and offences linked to terrorist activities are very precisely defined, the same can
unfortunately not be said for the concepts of incitement, complicity and attempt, whose defi-
nitions are left to Member States.”). See ICJ Report, supra note 103, at 4. (“The ICJ is con-
cerned at the recent trend in European states towards the criminalization of a wider
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The compromise created more of a problem than it intended. The EU
Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights concluded that
“the breadth of the definition of terrorism in the Framework Decision
breache[d] the principle of legal certainty.”116 The definition of “public
speech” and “danger” went unaddressed. The distinction between partici-
pation in the activities of a terrorist group and complicity was similarly
unacknowledged in the text. The broad and amorphous standard created
by the European Union urged member states to criminalize incitement,
but provided few guidelines about how to define these complex terms.
B. Fractured Member State Approaches
The European Union’s Framework Decision essentially asked its
member states the following question: “[A]t what point exactly does legiti-
mate opinion or political speech about the root causes of terrorism be-
come a justification of terrorism?”117 There is no easy answer to this
question. Many of the concepts from the Framework Decision were diffi-
cult to pin down, putting legislatures at “risk of [using] excessively broad
definitions.”118 As of 2004, only six EU countries had national legislation
defining the “apologie” of terrorism and/or “incitement to terrorism” as a
specific criminal offense: Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Spain, and
the UK.119 The rest of the EU member states chose not to enact legisla-
tion defining the “apologie” of terrorism and/or “incitement to terrorism”
as specific criminal offenses.120 Instead, these states relied on their general
criminal legislation–from criminal codes, penal codes, and constitutions–to
make these offenses prosecutable.121 As a result of these different ap-
proaches, legislative language varied widely from country to country. In-
citement to terrorism was variously described as inducement, incitement,
instigation, furthering, motivating or counselling the commission of a
crime, or publishing calls for violence.122 The issue was further compli-
cated by the fact that some of the variation in language was due to transla-
spectrum of speech offences, extending to broad categories of indirect incitement such as
apologie du terrorisme, glorification, encouragement, or justification of terrorism. The
breadth and indeterminacy of these offences, in particular where they are tied to wide defini-
tions of terrorism in national law, threaten the principle of legality, a core element of the rule
of law.”).
116. RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON INCITING, AIDING
OR ABETTING TERRORIST OFFENSES, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 10 (2007), available at http://
www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2011/docs/icj/icj-2007-ec-questionaire.pdf.
117. OSCE Report, supra note 51, at 10.
118. Id.
119. Comm. of Experts on Terrorism [CODEXTER], 3rd Meeting, Council of Eur.,
“Apologie du Terrorisme” and “Incitement to Terrorism”, 15 (July 6-8, 2004) available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/Working_Documents/2004/CODEXTER%20_
2004_%2004%20rev%20e%20Report%20on%20apologie%20and%20incitement.pdf,
[Hereinafter CODEXTER Exec. Report].
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 23.
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tion.123 National courts throughout the EU have reacted against the broad
scope of these statutes, construing them narrowly to avoid restricting the
freedom of expression.
Spain is one of the six countries that has legislation criminalizing the
“apologie” or glorification of terrorism. The Spanish Penal Code criminal-
izes ‘apologia’ (justification) of terrorism and ‘enaltecimiento’ (glorifica-
tion), including “acts that discredit or humiliate the victims of
terrorism.”124 The law in Spain distinguishes between incitement and apo-
logie; the latter is “understood as a phrase which follows provocation.”125
“Provocation exists when ‘direct incitement’ to commit a crime is made by
means of printed material, radio broadcasting, or another effective
method that facilitates publicity.”126 It does not concern “mere ideologi-
cally motivated statements, but the approval of criminal behavior.” To
prosecute, the government must consider the incitement dangerous insofar
as it may incite others to commit the offense.127 The offense of “justifying”
terrorism is an inchoate offense, meaning that is independent of whether
an act is actually committed.128 The acts ought to be committed in the
public domain or through public communication.129
In 2007, the Spanish Supreme Court considered the case of a Basque
punk band that had been accused of an offense under Article 578 of the
criminal code for a song which referenced the Guardia Civil as targets of
the ETA, a Basque separatist organization.130 “[T]he Court found that a
narrow reading of the provision was necessary in order to comply with
Article 10 of the ECHR and that the accused had been properly acquitted
on the facts of the case.”131 A year after the case, Martin Schienin, the UN
Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, criticized the
broad reach of the “incitement” provisions, arguing that they “carry the
123. Id.
124. Briefing Paper of the Directorate-General Internal Policies, Policy Department C,
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs on the Human Rights Concerns Relevant to Legis-
lating on Provocation or Incitement to Terrorism and Related Offences, at 7 (Mar. 2008)
[hereinafter Briefing Paper], available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/apr/ep-incite-
ment-to-terrorism-paper.pdf.
125. CODEXTER Exec. Report, supra note 119, at 19.
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. at 39.
128. In Spain, Articles 18 and 579 of the Spanish Penal Code criminalize public incite-
ment to commit an act of terrorism. Article 578 punishes the crime of praising terrorism, an
offence that was incorporated in the Penal Code by Organic Law 7/2000 of 22 December
2000. This article provides that “Apologism or justification by means of public expression or
diffusion of the felonies included in articles 571 to 577 of this Code [Crimes of Terrorism] or
of anyone who has participated in commission thereof, or in perpetrating acts that involve
discredit, disdain or humiliation of the victims of terrorist offences or of their relatives shall
be punished with a sentence of imprisonment from one to two years.” Arts. 18, 578–79 C.P.
(Spain).
129. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 21.
130. S.T.S., July 17, 2007 (J.T.S., No. 656) (Spain).
131. Id. See also Briefing Paper, supra note 124, at 7.
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risk of a ‘slippery slope,’ i.e. the gradual broadening of the notion of ter-
rorism to acts that do not amount to, and do not have sufficient connection
to, acts of serious violence against members of the general population.”132
In more recent developments, the Court has devoted significant time
to narrowing the scope of the Spanish statute.133 In February 2014, a
young Spanish woman was convicted of inciting terror over Twitter.134 Ms.
González Camacho, a student in southern Spain, claimed to be unaffiliated
with any political organization.135 But her tweets had invoked a political
group called the Grapo, who had killed more than eighty people in the late
1970s and 1980s.136 Even though Grapo never formally disbanded, secur-
ity officials believe it to be no longer operative.137 According to the New
York Times, “[t]he group’s dormancy did not matter to the judge, who
accepted the prosecution’s argument, which said that Ms. González Cama-
cho had posted ‘messages with an ideological content that was highly radi-
calized and violent,’ violating an article in the Spanish Constitution that
prohibits any apology for or glorification of terrorism.”138 The decision
was criticized by Spanish criminal attorney Carlos Sáiz Dı́az, who claimed
that “legislators are always a step behind the new technology . . . We’re
moving on unclear ground . . . which runs against the principle of legal
certainty.”139 Ms. González Camacho was sentenced to one year in prison
but will avoid jail time under a plea bargain.140
In the United Kingdom, prosecutors have wide discretion to deter-
mine when to prosecute the crime of inciting terrorism.141 They must take
into account the right of freedom of speech, the context in which the state-
ments were made, and the likelihood that they could effectively incite
132. Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism
Concludes Visit to Spain (May 14, 2008).
133. For its most recent decision concerning this issue, see S.T.S., Jun. 5, 2009 (J.T.S.
4503) (Spain). See also Detenido un hombre por enaltecimiento del terrorismo a través de
Internet, EUROPA PRESS, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.europapress.es/portaltic/internet/noticia-
detenido-hombre-enaltecimiento-terrorismo-traves-internet-20091201191800.html (describ-
ing a case in which a young man was prosecuted by Spanish authorities for ‘enaltecimiento’
[glorification] for posting comments that were disrespectful of two policemen that were killed
in a terrorist attack in July 2009.).
134. Raphael Minder, In a First for Spain, a Woman Is Convicted of Inciting Terror over








141. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 106 (“[Specifically, UK] prosecutors make
these decisions in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which provides a thresh-
old for charging based on evidential sufficiency and public interest. Prosecutors must be satis-
fied that the evidence before them discloses a ‘realistic prospect of conviction’ before
charging a suspect with a particular offence.”).
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others to violence or hostility.142 In the wake of the 2005 London Bomb-
ings, the UK developed new policy guidelines. Then-Prime Minister Tony
Blair proposed a new offense criminalizing the act of glorifying terrorism
in the UK. This proposal sought to broaden the scope of existing legisla-
tion, which only prohibited direct incitement to terrorism, by criminalizing
glorification language.143 The initiative to criminalize indirect incitement
faced withering criticism that the terms ‘glorification’ and ‘indirect encour-
agement’ of terrorism did not allow people to appropriately self-regulate
their conduct.144 The 2006 Terrorism Bill ended up being a compromise
since it dealt solely with the encouragement of terrorism, which “still re-
mains wider than the existing law of criminal incitement.”145
The UK Court of Appeal overturned the conviction of a group of stu-
dents who had been convicted under the Section 57 of the UK Terrorism
Act for inciting each other to terrorism.146 The students possessed CDs
with extremist propaganda downloaded from the Internet. They were us-
ing the material to encourage each other to go to Pakistan to get military
training that could be used in the Afghani jihad.147 The Court applied a
narrow construction of the offense of incitement, holding that there was
no clear connection between the possession of extremist propaganda and
the incitement of an act of terrorism.148 The UN Policy Department later
remarked that “the fact of the original conviction, however, shows the risk
inherent in legislation that is broadly drawn.”149
Germany is one of the many European countries that does not have a
specific statute criminalizing incitement. The German Penal Code covers
“incitement” to terrorism under Section 130, Sub-Section 1, Paragraph 1.
Specifically, a person must disturb the public peace by inciting “hatred
against sections of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures
142. Id. at 39.
143. Minder, supra note 134.
144. U.N. Secretary-General, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
while Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/61/267 (Aug. 16, 2006) (transmitting the report by
Martin Scheinin entitled Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism).
145. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 21.
146. R. v. Zafar, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 184, [49], [2008] Q.B. 810 (Eng.). At trial, Zafar
and Iqbal were acquitted on one count, which charged them with possession of three “philos-
ophy discs” containing material emanating from Raja; however, they, together with the other
defendants, were found guilty in respect of all other charges. Malik was sentenced to three
years of imprisonment, Zafar and Iqbal to three years of detention in a young offenders’
institution, Butt to 27 months of detention and Raja to two years of detention. Id. at [10],
[11].
147. Id. at [1].
148. See id. at [48]; see also UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 33. (“On the facts of the
case, noting that it raised difficult questions of interpretation about the scope of application
of section 57, the Court held that the necessary connection was not present, and therefore the
resulting convictions were unsound, and allowed the appeals.”).
149. Briefing Paper, supra note 124, at 7.
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against them.”150 A person has committed a criminal offense if they en-
gage in the “dissemination, public display, posting, or presentation of such
calls in writing or other forms of imaging.”151 This language was inter-
preted by the German Federal Court of Justice in 2007, which limited the
offense of “campaigning” for a terrorist group.152 The defendant was pros-
ecuted for distributing audio and video messages from Al Qaeda on the
Internet. The messages called for jihad and justified terrorist attacks. The
court held that the actual recruitment to a terrorist organization was re-
quired. It also reduced the possible sentence from ten to five years.153
National courts have hemmed in legislation that criminalizes incite-
ment to terrorism with overly broad language.154 Lurking in the back-
ground of the incitement debate is the possibility that domestic
prosecutions might have a chilling effect on civil society’s exercise of free
speech.155 Courts have sought to avoid this outcome, demonstrating that it
is important to have a constructive discussion about minority rights and
perceived acts of terrorism.156 During a terrorism-prevention meeting at-
tended by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), Russia, and Germany, the group discussed the criminalization of
inciting terrorism.157 The group concluded that domestic courts and the
European Court of Human Rights “can be instrumental” in helping
“defin[e] the conditions” for criminalizing incitement, specifically by rely-
ing on the “principles of legality, necessity and proportionality found both
in the regional and international human rights instruments.”158
C. Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights has been a leader in judging
the balance between the governmental interest and individual rights in the
context of terrorist incitement. The main guarantee for the freedom of
150. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3214, as amended,
§130, para. 1, sentence 1 (Ger.).
151. CODEXTER Exec. Note, supra note 119, at 30.
152. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 16, 2007, 71 J. CRIM. L.
491, 2008 (Ger.).
153. Id.
154. See UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 135. (“The development and enforcement
of laws criminalizing the incitement of acts of terrorism while fully protecting human rights
(e.g. the right to freedom of expression) presents an ongoing challenge for policymakers,
legislators, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors in all countries.”).
155. See id. at 145; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2008: EVENTS OF 2007
388 (2008) (discussing a case in Germany where two academics were arrested for being “in-
tellectual supporters of a militant left-wing faction allegedly responsible for a series of arson
attacks”).
156. ICJ Report, supra note 103, at 5.
157. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 11 (describing the debate over the scope of incite-
ment speech covered by the Convention). Again, this impact is likely to be most strongly felt
in “already alienated minority communities,” where discussion of issues related to terrorism
“needs to be encouraged, rather than stifled.” Id. at 26.
158. Id. at 11.
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expression is found in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). The Court has applied a balancing test in its considera-
tion of “incitement” cases, weighing the legal certainty, necessity, and pro-
portionality of a state’s response to speech associated with terrorism.
‘Legal certainty’ implies that legal standards are properly crafted to allow
individuals the ability to regulate their own conduct.159 ‘Necessary’ does
not mean indispensable; instead, it implies a “pressing social need” that
must accord with the requirements of a democratic society.160 Proportion-
ality means there must be a reasonable relationship between the means
employed and the aims achieved.161 The ECtHR’s inquiries are fact-spe-
cific and consider the totality of the circumstances.162 The OSCE claims
these inquiries have “never been simple.”163
Despite the difficulty of the ECtHR’s task, the European Union can
draw valuable insights from past cases.164 The Court has allowed states to
restrict freedom of expression on a national security basis, as well as other
grounds described in Article 10 (2). But Article 10 also provides the metric
by which the Court has found state violations of freedom of expression
where the definition of an offense was too vague.165 The following cases
have produced a series of factors that the Court has used to balance indi-
vidual rights with the governmental interest.
The ECtHR has expressed in numerous cases that the link between
incitement and the potentiality of violence was an important factor in their
balancing test. In Leroy v. France, the ECtHR did not find a violation of
Article 10 in the case of a journalist who had been convicted of publishing
a controversial cartoon in a Basque newspaper.166 On Sep. 13, 2001, the
newspaper published a cartoon depicting an attack on the World Trade
Centre with a parody of a famous advertising slogan: “We have all dreamt
of it . . . Hamas did it” (cf. “Sony did it”).167 The Court reasoned that the
drawing went further than merely criticizing the United States; it “sup-
159. OSCE Report, supra note 51, at 7.
160. Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 753
(1976).
161. Factors to consider when assessing whether or not an action is disproportionate
are: “(1) Have relevant and sufficient reasons been advanced in support of it? (2) Was there a
less restrictive measure? (3) Has there been some measure of procedural fairness in the deci-
sion making process? (4) Do safeguards against abuse exist? (5) Does the restriction in ques-
tion destroy the ‘very essence’ of the right in question?” OSCE Report, supra note 51, at 7.
162. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, 109 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 40 (1986); Barfod v.
Denmark, 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 28 (1989); Hogefeld v. Germany, App. No. 35402/97
(2000), (“The Court must look at the impugned interference in the light of the case as a
whole. In particular, it must determine whether the interference in issue was ‘proportionate
to the legitimate aims pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities
to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient.”).
163. OSCE Report, supra note 51, at 13–14.
164. Id.
165. See Hashman v. United Kingdom, 1999-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 13–16.
166. Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1–3, 17 (2008).
167. Id. ¶ 6; UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 42.
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ported and glorified its violent destruction.”168 The Court stated that the
caption indicated the cartoonists’ moral support for the perpetrators of the
September 11 attacks.169 The Court took numerous factors into account,
including the cartoonist’ choice of language, the sensitive date of the publi-
cation, and the politically sensitive nature of the region in which it was
distributed.170 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime stated that “[t]he prin-
ciples developed in this landmark case will apply equally to cases in which
the alleged incitement to terrorism has occurred via the Internet.”171
In Hogefeld v. Germany, the ECtHR accepted that a measure limiting
freedom of expression was justifiable in a case of indirect incitement,
where the applicant’s previous statements could be understood by sup-
porters as an appeal to continue the violent activities of the Red Army
Faction (RAF) terrorist group, in light of her background as an RAF rep-
resentative.172 In Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1), the owner of a Turkish newspa-
per was prosecuted for publishing two readers’ letters strongly criticizing
the violence of Turkish military operations in the southeast corner of the
country.173 The Court did not find that the state’s actions violated Article
10, holding, “the impugned letters amounted to an appeal to bloody re-
venge by stirring up base emotions and hardening already embedded
prejudices which had manifested themselves in deadly violence.”174 The
decision was hotly disputed, with seven of eighteen judges partly dissent-
ing.175 The dissenting judges argued that the real and imminent risk of
those letters inciting violence or hatred had not been proved. Some of the
dissenters said the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brandenburg test should be
used.176
Over time, the ECtHR has considered a number of factors to deter-
mine when free speech should be protected by the European Charter on
Human Rights. Three cases from Turkey illustrate the application of these
factors. In Ceylan v. Turkey, the Court considered an article written by a
trade-union leader, which described the Turkish military operations in the
South East as “State terrorism,” “genocide,” and “bloody massacres.”177
The letter called for a reaction from the democratic forces of the nation.178
The Court, pointing out the importance of political speech, found “that the
article in question, despite its virulence, does not encourage the use of
168. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 42.
169. See Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1–3 (2008); see also
UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 42.
170. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 42.
171. Id.
172. Hogefeld v. Germany, App. No. 35402/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6–8 (2000),
173. Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 355.
174. Id. at 356.
175. Id. at 392–99.
176. Id. at 394.
177. Ceylan v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 32–33.
178. Id. at 39.
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violence or armed resistance or insurrection” and accordingly registered a
violation of Article 10.179
In Karataş v. Turkey, the Court held that poetic expression (directed
to a small audience) had a “limited impact” on national security, notwith-
standing some lines calling for violence with quite aggressive tones.180
Considering the poems, the Court affirmed: “the fact that they [the
poems] were artistic in nature and of limited impact made them less a call
to an uprising than an expression of deep distress in the face of a difficult
political situation.”181 Similarly, in Incal v. Turkey, the court held that
criminal conviction for the dissemination of a pamphlet was in violation of
Article 10 ECHR, considering the (1) severity of the sanction, (2) the fact
that the applicant sought an authorization from the prefecture but was
arrested the next day before he could circulate the leaflet, (3) the fact that
the applicant is a member of one of the opposition’s political parties, and
(4) because the document was not considered by the ECtHR as clearly
inciting violence or hatred among Turkish citizens.182
These ECtHR cases illustrate that the Court is consistently trying to
determine the degree to which certain statement are actually likely to in-
cite violence. Other facts considered by the court are: the format of the
expression and the audience (including its artistic merits), the general po-
litical situation in a country, the severity of the governmental sanction,
“the status of the person (e.g. a member of a political party)” and the
intent of the person.183 The Court has never set a rigid probability test, but
it does weigh the credible nature of the danger, the author and the ad-
dressee of the message, and the context in which the offence is committed.
IV. THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH IN THE EU
The decisions of the ECtHR and national courts should inform Euro-
pean Union policy on the “incitement” of terrorism. Even though the Lis-
bon Treaty abolished the passage of new Framework Decisions, they are
still in effect. The analysis of European courts can help the EU to explore
new legislative options, such as directives, to address the most ambiguous
elements of the Framework Decision. These elements include the subjec-
tive intent to incite violence, the likelihood of future acts, and speech that
is actually public. The EU can improve enforcement by dedicating re-
sources to address the root causes of radicalization and violence. Part A
offers a non-exhaustive list of legislative prescriptions to improve the
Framework Decision. Part B argues that a change in the legal framework
must be supported by stronger enforcement efforts, specifically engage-
ment with at-risk communities throughout the Europe.
179. Id. at 40.
180. Karataş v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 109.
181. Id.
182. Incal v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 49–59.
183. OSCE Report, supra note 51, at 21.
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A. Legislative Prescriptions
A handful of scholars and international organizations have offered
their prescriptions for defining the incitement of terrorism.184 There is a
split in the debate between advocates who believe that legislative change
is necessary and those who do not.185 Advocates who do not think legisla-
tive change is necessary believe that any changes the EU might undertake
would be more likely to further restrict freedom of expression than clarify
existing standards.186 Considering the trend of courts limiting overly broad
legislation, I argue that a clarification of the legal standard on the incite-
ment of terrorism is necessary. To uphold the principle of legal certainty—
that is, that people can actually understand the legal limits of their con-
duct—the EU should consider a new set of directives on cyberterrorism
with consideration paid to the factors used by the ECtHR and national
courts. The EU should also consider the unique challenges posed by
speech on the Internet, including distinctions between public and private
communication.
Any legislative language dealing with the complicated areas of terror-
ism and free speech should be carefully targeted and proportionate. The
European Union should strongly consider the following factors in clarify-
ing the 2002 Framework Decision on Terrorism. First, the indirect incite-
ment of terrorism should be criminalized when it evidences a subjective
intent to incite violence. Second, there should be a direct causal connec-
tion between incitement and the likelihood of violence. Third, the
criminalized speech must offer specific support for future terrorist acts.
And fourth, the speech must be public in nature. Each one of these ele-
ments will be examined in turn. The analysis presented here is by no
means an exhaustive list, but should serve to identify some of the most
pressing concerns.
The first element that the EU should clarify is the intent to incite vio-
lence. Advocates have explained that mens rea should be carefully ad-
dressed in the description of incitement as a criminal offense.187 The intent
to incite terrorism requires some purposeful knowledge of how the speech
will impact a wider community and actually motivate violence. The distinc-
tion between an intent to incite and recklessness as to incitement is nota-
184. See Briefing Paper, supra note 124; ICJ Report, supra note 103; Van Ginkel, supra
note 35; Megan Anne Healey, Comment, How the Legal Regimes of the European Union and
the United States Approach Islamic Terrorist Web Sites: A Comparative Analysis, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 165 (2009).
185. The Briefing Paper and the ICJ do not believe that further legislation is necessary.
Van Ginkel argues that legislation must clearly define the following elements: (1) target con-
duct; (2) content of speech; (3) public/private distinction; (4) imminence/likelihood of causa-
tion; (5) intent to incite. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 2.
186. See Briefing Paper, supra note 124, at 8 (“[T]o introduce such legislation would
have a disproportionate impact on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression in the
European Union.”).
187. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 14.
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bly absent from the language of the Framework Decision.188 Similarly
absent from the Framework Decision is the mention of violence. The
Framework Decision merely refers to the danger of a terrorist act being
committed.189 The European Union should take its cue from the ECtHR,
which has held that inciting violence is a key factor in considering the
criminality of terroristic incitement.190 The subjective intent element to
incite violence is important to prevent the governmental imposition of ob-
jective penal responsibility, which is prohibited in international law.191
The second element requiring EU clarification is the causal link be-
tween incitement and the likelihood of violence. There should be some
direct link between an individual’s speech and the likelihood of a violent
terrorist act being committed. The Johannesburg Principles on National
Security, Freedom of Expression, and Access to Information (Johannes-
burg Principles) advocate that “expression may be punished as a threat to
national security” if the government can demonstrate, among other ele-
ments that “there is a direct and immediate connection between the ex-
pression and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence.”192 The causal
relationship between speech and violence helps to ensure that there is a
concrete threat associated with a potential act of violence. It is problem-
atic to characterize incitement as an inchoate offense, because speech is
then completely divorced from the execution of terrorist act.
The third element requiring clarification is that the speech support a
violent terroristic act that will occur in the future. This element is deeply
intertwined with intent and causality. All acts must have requisite intent
and a causal relationship to a potential act of violence. The ECtHR has
held that criminalizing certain acts that denigrate victims but do not have
any link to a future terrorist act risk non-compliance with Article 10 of the
ECHR. In considering the past and future distinction, the ECtHR has de-
bated the applicability of the Brandenburg standard. It is particularly use-
ful in this context, since it provides that the First Amendment does not
“permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or produc-
188. ICJ Report, supra note 103, at 10 (“A number of elements are not explicit in the
Framework Decision and may vary in incitement offences in national law. These include: the
level of intent that is required to incite to an act of terrorism, and whether the requirement is
one of intent to incite, or recklessness as to incitement.”).
189. 2002 Framework Decision, supra note 7, at art. 1.
190. See Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 356 (holding that prosecu-
tion of a newspaper for the publication of letters detailing torture by state agents was
justified).
191. The Nuremberg Tribunal recognized members of three Nazi organizations to be
guilty of particular offences, but rejected objective penal individual responsibility for mem-
bership of the group, unless the individual had participated voluntarily and acknowledged the
criminal goals of the group. See U.N. Security General, Report of the Secretary General pur-
suant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc S/2/25704 (May 3,
1993).
192. ARTICLE 19, JOHANNESBURG PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION princ. 6 (1995).
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ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.”193 The focus of the Brandenburg standard is on future acts, precisely
where it should be. The European Court of Human Rights—in dissent—
has even considered adopting certain elements of the Brandenburg test.194
This logic has been echoed by the Johannesburg Principles discussed
above, since causality implies some future action.195
In the context of Internet expression, “public speech” must be care-
fully addressed. For example, is it a crime for people to incite terrorism on
a closed forum or chatroom? To qualify as incitement, speech should be
directed at a general audience in a place that is public. Instant messaging,
Facebook posting, or members-only websites should not qualify. Public
Twitter and Instagram accounts should qualify, since it is a truly public
forum capable of reaching a wide public audience. Non-public incitement
can be covered by general criminal law, especially if concrete planning of a
terrorist event is involved. Nonetheless, it can be difficult to define exactly
every public/private distinction as it occurs on the Internet. The EU
should conduct context-specific inquiries that consider the number of peo-
ple involved in an incitement case, as well as the accessibility of their dia-
logue about terrorist actions, past or present.196
States must ensure that their actions targeting the incitement of ter-
rorism fully conform with their international obligations under human
rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.197 Governments should for-
mulate offenses in terms that are as close as possible to international in-
struments. Legislation should not be drafted in an unduly restrictive
manner. This will allow legal authorities and judges to assess the substance
of the unlawful conduct that is the subject of requests “rather than adopt-
ing an unduly narrow approach.”198
B. Enforcement Prescriptions
The European Union can play an active role in facilitating inter-gov-
ernmental cooperation through its Third Pillar. The EU has created both
strategic and operational initiatives. Beginning in 2004, the European
Council agreed on a five-year plan called the Hague Programme to de-
velop the areas of freedom, security, and justice. One of the primary areas
for analysis and action was the fight against terrorism. In 2005 the EU
Presidency and the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator presented the Euro-
pean Union Council with a comprehensive strategy containing four com-
ponent parts: (1) to prevent, (2) to protect, (3) to pursue, and (4) to
respond. Under the first component part, the EU’s main goal is “[t]o pre-
vent people [from] turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root
193. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
194. See Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 394.
195. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 15.
196. Id. at 14.
197. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 135.
198. Id. at 95.
Winter 2015] Incitement of Terrorism on the Internet 349
causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment.”199 Specifically,
the EU has resolved to “[(1)] disrupt the activities of the networks and
individuals that draw people into terrorism; [(2)] ensure that voices of
mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; [and (3)] promote
security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all even more
forcefully.”200
At the operational level, the European Police Office (EUROPOL)
conducts Internet policing in a variety of capacities. The European Parlia-
ment has several standing committees that address cyberterrorism in some
capacity. The Committee on Industry, Research and Technology (ITRE)
concerns the information society and information technology, including
the establishment and development of trans-European networks in the tel-
ecommunication infrastructure sector. The Committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has oversight of legislation in the areas
of transparency and of the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data. The Committee on Culture and Education
(CULT) addresses audiovisual policy and the cultural and educational as-
pects of the information society.201
Law enforcement in European countries can learn a great deal infor-
mation about terrorist activities from websites and chat rooms. Authorities
are able to compile electronic data for counter-terrorism purposes. In-
creasingly sophisticated tools, such as CleanIT, can detect terrorist activ-
ity. CleanIT is an information technology initiative used for flagging
terrorist content. CleanIT administrators contact Internet providers to en-
courage them to block the flagged material. The European Commission
originally funded CleanIT in 2010 with a grant of C= 400,000.202 The aim is
to create “a non-legislative ‘framework’ that consists of general principles
and best practices. . . to counter the illegal use of Internet,” according to
the group203
For CleanIT to be truly effective, it must be part of a larger law en-
forcement effort to engage at-risk youth on websites and chat services.
Shutting down extremist websites may not be enough.204 Removal or pro-
hibition of websites might have a short-term positive effect, but will only
encourage the republication of the web site under a different name.205 The
199. Presidency & Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 3,
Doc. 14469/4/05 (Nov. 30, 2005).
200. COREPER, Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to
Terrorism, 3, Doc. No. 15175/08 (Nov. 14, 2008).
201. Id.
202. Cyrus Farivar, Europe’s Quixotic Plan to “Clean” the Internet of Terrorists, ARS
TECHNICA (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/europes-quix-
otic-plan-to-clean-the-internet-of-terrorists/.
203. Id.
204. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 8 (“In a policy brief of the Center on Global
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, Liat Shetret argues that it is sometimes better not to re-
move or ban websites on which extreme ideas are communicated.”).
205. See Internet Jihad, supra note 3.
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removal or the prohibition can fail to counter the message itself.206 The
Economist notes that, “attempts to close down extremist sites are little
more than short-lived harassment. What is needed is a systematic cam-
paign of counter-propaganda, not least in support of friendly Muslim gov-
ernments and moderate Muslims, to try to reclaim the ground ceded to the
jihadists.”207 By facilitating a constructive debate, law enforcement may
discourage potential terrorists.208
Yet replacing one form of propaganda with another must be coupled
with other initiatives; it cannot be used as a stand-alone measure. The
deep roots of discontent found in Europe’s disenfranchised populations
require a multifaceted approach. Although CleanIT is a start, the Euro-
pean Union will need to devote more than C= 400,000 to effectively counter
terroristic incitement on the Internet.209 The EU should make a concerted
effort to hire translators and law enforcement officials that not only speak
Arabic, but also understand the historical and contemporary dimensions
of Islamic fundamentalism. In order to promote alternatives to radicaliza-
tion, experts must be able to advance a compelling counter-narrative.210
By engaging at-risk populations on the Internet, these experts can
“weaken cult personalities, challenge extremist doctrine, dispel the terror-
ist lifestyle, and offer a street-smart, locally developed and communicated
answer.”211
If the European Union is serious about its counter-terrorism goals—
such as “community policing, and effective monitoring of the In-
ternet”212—it must prioritize an integrated strategy.
Academics and policymakers have advocated for a non-military ap-
proach to combating terrorism called the human security paradigm.213
This approach seeks to address the deep inequities and disenfranchise-
ment that drives terrorist activity. Human security is “defined as freedom
from violent conflict and physical want.”214 This can take many forms in-
cluding proper access to food and water, education, public health pro-
grams, housing, and protection from violence, military or otherwise.
Canada and Norway have led the charge by establishing a “human security
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. UNODC REPORT, supra note 18, at 12.
209. Farivar, supra note 202.
210. Internet Jihad, supra note 3.
211. Van Ginkel, supra note 35, at 8.
212. Presidency, Report of the Presidency on the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisa-
tion and Recruitment to Terrorism, at 3, COREPER and the Council of the EU, Doc. No.
14781/1/05 REV 1 (Nov. 24, 2005).
213. See generally Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Allevi-
ating Human Misery?, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 231 (2001); Astri Suhrke, Human Security
and the Interests of States, 30 SECURITY DIALOGUE 265 (1999).
214. AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES: PANEL ON ADVANCING THE SCI. OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 300
(2010).
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network” of states and NGOs that “endorse the concept” of human secur-
ity.215 A number of EU states have joined the network, including Austria,
Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It is vital to involve a
diverse group of actors such as governments, non-profits, citizens, and in-
ternational organizations.
The EU can also bring religious and political groups into the fold in
order to mitigate the radicalizing effects of violent rhetoric.216 Intercul-
tural debates and educational initiatives can actively promote respect for
human rights and individual liberties.217 To be truly effective in this con-
text, EU law enforcement must build empathy within at-risk communities
to demonstrate that violence is not a desired outcome in any context. The
European Union is in a unique position to assume a coordinating function
that brings together all of the relevant stakeholders: member states,
NGOs, and officials from national and regional courts.218
CONCLUSION
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the current European Union and
member state definitions on the incitement of terrorism. The Internet
compounds these problems by creating open fora for the perpetuation of
controversial speech. The EU should seek to clarify the old Framework
Decisions by passing new directives to elucidate the principle of legal cer-
tainty. By clarifying the legal standard on incitement, the EU can en-
courage free speech within the boundaries of its Framework Decision. This
kind of action will set an example for its member states, many of whom
have passed overly broad legislation that has since been narrowed by na-
tional courts. These judgments, along with those from the European Court
of Human Rights, provide a ready-made example of how to structure the
language of a directive. The EU will address many of the Framework De-
cision’s most ambiguous elements by focusing on the subjective intent to
incite violence, the likelihood of future acts, and speech that is actually
public. Moreover, the EU can improve enforcement by dedicating re-
sources to law enforcement that can engage with at-risk populations to
mitigate against radicalization and violence.
215. Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, 26 INT’L SECURITY 87,
87 (2001).
216. Healey, supra note 186, at 175.
217. Id. (“To ensure that the European Union promotes justice, democracy, security,
and opportunity for everyone, the European Union targets identified areas of discrimination
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pean Union, the European Union promotes human rights, education, good governance, and
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